ABSTRACT Energy harvesting refers to energy-supply guaranteed solutions in Internet of Things for functional maintenance, because network nodes can absorb energy from surrounding environments. However, once the environment turns into a harsh condition (e.g., desert, ocean, or battlefield), the design of a robust network model must take into account two intractable factors: 1) the flexibility of users' heterogeneous requirements and 2) the influence of unpredictable emergency in energy harvesting. Consequently, spectrum resource allocation revolved issues become rather challenging. To tackle this problem, we build the central network into a combinatorial auction model where complex interactions between the access point and users can be captured. Meanwhile, our model preserves the user flexibility in time-frequency domain. Based on this model, we demonstrate both the energy supply of access point and the network performance can be guaranteed. Moreover, we propose an approximation algorithm to obtain efficient and effective results, and further provide incentives for users to anticipate a truthful auction. Finally, we modify the proposed model to be practical and yet truthful for pursuing an optimal solution. Extensive simulations validate the effectiveness and robustness of our proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly gaining ground in the integration of networks, especially in wireless networks, and has wide applications in industry [1] - [3] . Recently, its deployment in harsh environments (e.g., desert, ocean or battlefield) has become a trend. However, the insufficient energy supply brought forth by such environments, which restricts the network function (e.g., communication services), is an inevitable roadblock in IoT's official use. So far, the energy-constrained wireless networks (e.g., wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [4] ), where devices are replaceable or rechargeable, is now barely applied in such environments. But there still remains lots of intractability in the aspects of network charging and maintaining.
The recent breakthrough to resolve above problem derives from energy harvesting [5] , [6] , and self-adaptive control [7] , which can drastically mutate conventional wireless networks [8] . Energy harvesting, by which network nodes can absorb energy from the surrounding environment (e.g. solar energy, electromagnetic energy) [9] - [11] , has been well studied. Meanwhile, extensive works have been carried out, including system design [12] , energy cooperation [13] , energy allocation [14] , resource scheduling [16] , and lifetime prolongation [15] . However, since each node in an energy harvesting network shares the limited spectrum bandwidth with others, it is particularly crucial to design an efficient and effective spectrum allocation strategy.
To better utilize the network resource, researchers have marvelous solutions. Considering the varying channel conditions and energy sources over a finite time span, Ho and Zhang [17] allocated the energy resource to maximize the network throughput. Gao et al. [18] proposed monopolistdominated quality-price contract to achieve efficient utilization of spectrum resource. Ding et al. [19] applied relay strategies in wireless cooperative networks, to allocate energy among users. Gao et al. [20] adopted auction mechanism for improving the spectrum utilization. Wang et al. developed optimal energy-bandwidth allocation for the energy harvesting transmitters with iterative dynamic water-filling algorithms [21] , [22] . Particularly, in centralized networks, the client nodes (i.e., users) want to access the files stored in resource center to maintain their services, as shown in Fig. 1 . Therefore, the access point should know the requirements of these client nodes and make a proper spectrum allocation strategy. Each component in Fig. 1 is described in more detail in Section II. However, requirements of client nodes are heterogeneous and time-frequency flexible.
If we fail to pay enough attention to this, unfortunately, the valuable spectrum resource may be wasted. Furthermore, even the energy harvesting state can be predicted for a shortterm a prior [23] , [24] , one cannot obtain a precisely foresight of some destructive damage, such as the human/animal destruction and extreme weather. Therefore, the energy supply cannot be guaranteed in wireless networks. These motivate us to design a robust network model in harsh conditions to defend unpredictable emergency when harvesting energy, and in the meanwhile, examine the users' time-frequency flexibility to improve the utilization ratio of existing spectrum resource.
However, the above questions are non-trivial to answer due to the following challenges: 1) stochastic nature of the environmental condition, which makes it difficult to ensure energy harvesting or communication services for the wireless nodes; 2) heterogeneous requirements, which exacerbate the contradictions between flexibility and efficiency of the network model (the resource allocation algorithm) and solving complexity; 3) selfishness of users, which makes the individual revenue and the overall performance highly coupled due to their expectation of obtain more spectrum resource with less energy cost.
To tackle previous challenges, we propose a combinatorial auction model [25] to analyze the resource allocation in a typical energy harvesting network illustrated by Fig. 1 in harsh environments.
In particular, the access point acts as an auctioneer in market to assign spectrum resource among client nodes.
According to [13] , the access point can obtain energy flow from client nodes to maintain his energy supply and further the network performance. We also propose a truthful strategy for client nodes to avoid auction manipulating and ensure the access point's profit. Moreover, due to the NP-hardness of optimal solution, we propose an efficient and effective approximation algorithm, and conduct theoretical analysis and simulations to validate its performance. We believe this gives important guidelines to design practical energy harvesting networks. To sum up, our main contributions are three-folds:
• A novel time-frequency flexible mechanism is proposed to capture the heterogeneous requirements of users. By leveraging a combinatorial auction model, the interactions between the access point and client nodes can be revealed, and the depiction and a robust energy harvesting network can be achieved.
• We propose an approximation algorithm for resource allocation in energy harvesting context. The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence are given in the following involving performance robustness under different environmental levels.
• Aiming at further addressing the allocation problem, modification of the original model is made to be more practical with a robustness test. Accordingly, a truthful payment strategy is formulated to ensure an optimal solution, which is proved by theoretical analysis and simulation. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we depict the system components and formulate the problem as a combinatorial auction model. Based on this model, we propose an approximation algorithm for winner determination and a truthful payment strategy for maintaining the access point's revenue in Section III. Section IV modifies the original model to a practical and also truthful one. Extensive simulation results are presented in Section V and we investigate related work in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper and points out our future works.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we will briefly survey the literature on the energy solutions to Internet of Things and the allocation strategies in energy harvesting networks, respectively.
A. ENERGY SOLUTIONS TO INTERNET OF THINGS
Internet of Things is a novel paradigm and it is rapidly developing in the communication scenarios of modern wireless networks. The basic idea of this concept is that a variety of things or objects around humans [33] , [34] , can interact with each other and cooperative with their neighbors to achieve common goals. In other words, Internet of Things is aiming at networking daily life objects for cooperation.
Although the new concept Internet of Things is attractive and promising in future network services, researchers VOLUME 6, 2018 find that some problems are still open in Internet of Things [35] , [36] : devices heterogeneity, energy scarcity, traffic diversity, privacy/security and etc. Among them, the energy scarcity issue severely constrains the performance of communication/network service and therefore, energy solutions to Internet of Things becomes more and more attractive.
An intuitive solution to energy scarcity problem is that we can design energy efficient schemes or systems to energy consumption and prolong the lifetime of networks [37] , [38] . Lin et al. proposed an adaptive algorithm to address transmission power control in WSN [39] . This solution can actually relieve the energy scarcity problem and maintain network services in a long period. However, it cannot address this particular issue since the energy supplement is indeed limited and in the meanwhile, most energy saving/efficient schemes perform with the cost of network performance.
What's more, energy harvesting [6] is a promising solution to address the energy scarcity and is able to mutate conventional wireless networks drastically [8] . Equipped with an energy harvesting module, the network device can absorb energy from the surrounding environment, including solar energy, vibration energy, thermoelectric energy, electromagnetic energy, etc [40] . This indicates that the communication devices can apply this new paradigm to guarantee the energy supplement and prolong the lifetime of networks in Internet of Things. Especially, to optimize wireless networks with energy harvesting, Huang and Ansari presented the basic design principles and challenges in [41] . Moreover, energy harvesting relieves the energy limitation and therefore, the performance of network/service can be improved [5] . Besides the IoT scenario, energy harvesting is also considered in other research domains, for example, in the cognitive radio networks [42] or OFDM systems [27] .
B. ALLOCATION STRATEGY IN ENERGY HARVESTING NETWORKS
The resource allocation problems in energy harvesting networks have attracted a lot of attention. Among various kinds of resources, the energy/power resource is crucial in energy harvesting networks. Ding et al. [19] designed a strategy to distribute harvested energy among multiple users in a wireless cooperative network with an energy harvesting relay. Nasir et al. optimized resource allocation problem in multicell networks with energy harvesting relays [43] . In [44] , Zhou et al. investigated an OFDM-based wireless powered communication system, where one user harvests energy from an energy access point to power its information transmission to a data access point.
Bandwidth/spectrum resource is another network service which can affect the performance of network/service significantly. Considering the energy-bandwidth allocation for a network with multiple broadcast channels, Wang et al. developed an efficient algorithm for the energy harvesting transmitters in [21] and [22] . Wang et al. [45] , [46] investigated scaling laws for multicast traffic and proposed scheduling strategies for enhancing network capacity and improving bandwidth utilization. Ansari and Han [47] introduced the FreeNet to increase the spectrum and energy efficiency of wireless networks and enhance network availability. However, these important works are conducted in the view of the network side, while the behaviors of network users are omitted. This point decreases the practicability of the application of energy harvesting networks.
Unlike previous works, our approach is time-frequency flexible and can capture the heterogeneous requirements of users. Modeling the interactions between the access point and client nodes as a combinatorial auction model, the network can guarantee its revenue and robustness. We also propose an approximation algorithm and show its efficiency and accuracy both theoretically and empirically.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we use systematic models to depict the communication scenario applied in centralized networks. Based on this model, we will clarify the information/energy flow and develop an auction theoretic model to capture the interactions between the access point and the client nodes.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a central wireless network where n client nodes share a bandwidth in the range of [F min , F max ]. A graphical representation of the system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 , which includes a resource center, a access point and a client network. Note that this model is operating in a time-slot fashion. In what follows we will describe these network components.
• Resource Center: the resource center stores various files, and it is the coordinator of spectrum resource. To meet heterogeneous requirements and improve the spectrum utilization ratio, the resource center divides the spectrum resource by time and frequency as shown in Fig. 2 . In order to support time-frequency flexibility, we define every k · f spectrum as the unit of allocated spectrum opportunity to client nodes, where k is the time interval and f is the frequency interval. • Access Point: the access point collects the requirements of the client nodes and allocates the spectrum opportunity for them, which indicates the access point is the resource center's interface to the client network. We assume that the access point is equipped with an energy harvesting device and a capacity-limited battery, as shown in Fig. 3 . The energy harvesting device is the only energy source of the access point: the access point can obtain necessary energy through its surrounding environment and client network.
• Client Network: the client network consists of client nodes and requests for heterogeneous spectrum opportunities to the access point. Client nodes can use their energy to exchange corresponding spectrum resource. The dash arrow in Fig. 1 indicates the division requirement to resource center. To simplify our theoretical analysis, we assume these requirements can be measured in the unit of spectrum opportunity. Familiar with the construction of access point, each client node also adopts energy harvesting as its unique energy supplement, as shown in Fig. 4 . 
B. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ACCESS POINT AND CLIENT NODES
Now let us focus on how to model the interactions between the access point and client network. For the centralized network, access point is the core of network service and processes the permission to access the resource center, i.e., the spectrum opportunity. The access point should regulate the operation of the entire network, including the contact with resource center, allocation of spectrum opportunity, and the management of his own system. Therefore, the primary goal for the access point is to maintain his energy supply, however, which is actually difficult in energy harvesting scenarios without a stable surrounding environment. On the other hand, client nodes want to exploit the spectrum opportunity and they are the consumers of spectrum resource. Different with the access point, each client node only needs to supervise his own communication. Since client nodes are usually located in the same area with the access point, a natural motivation is that we can compensate the access point with redundant energy of client nodes.
Before each auction process, only the access point can access the resource center. After the auction process, in the resource allocation period, winners of the clients are allocated with corresponding spectrum opportunities. In other words, the access authority to the resource center is now transferred from the access point to these winners. Equivalently, we can say this is the Information Flow since the authority flows from the access point to the client network. Simultaneously, we consider the energy consumption for client nodes in the auction model, which is used to exchange the access of spectrum opportunities. We define this energy movement as Energy Flow in Fig. 5 . In general, the trading scheme includes two types:
• Type 1: trading between energy harvesting devices and environment, where only energy flow occurs (denoted by the arrows 1 and 2 in Fig. 5 ). In this type, energy harvesting devices, including the access point and client network, can absorb energy from the environment.
• Type 2: trading between the access point and client network, where both the information flow (i.e., the arrow 4) and the energy flow (i.e., the arrow 3) exist. In this type, the energy can be transferred electromagnetically (for example, the RF [26] , [27] ).
C. A COMBINATORIAL AUCTION MODEL
This part depicts the interactions between access point and client network as a combinatorial auction model. Particularly, we only focus on the problem that how the access point allocates acquired spectrum to client nodes. Suppose that the resource center divides the spectrum into S = s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s j , . . . , s m , where s j is the jth spectrum opportunity in S, and m is the total number of the spectrum opportunity. In addition, there are also n client nodes in the network. Before each auction period, the client node i submits spectrum opportunities that he wants to access (denoted as S i ) and the nominal energy payment of these spectrum opportunities (denoted as e i ). Based on the auction model, the access point assigns spectrum opportunities among n client nodes denoted as N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We name these information offered by a client node as ''bid'' and use a twotuple b i = {S i , e i } to represent it, where S i ⊆ S.
Afterwards, the auction model needs to decide which client node can receive their expectations, and charge these client nodes to offer energy supplement. The winners are denoted as set W = w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w p , where w i ∈ N . Meanwhile, the energy payments of client nodes are denoted as P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, where p i = 0 if client node i loses. Now we can get the utility of client node i as
In a generic time slot k, we denote E k A as the harvested energy of access point in last time slot, i.e., (k − 1, k]. This implies the energy causality that the access point cannot consume the energy in harvesting. Suppose that the battery is empty initially, we can formulate the energy of the access point at the beginning of k as
where k = 1, 2, . . .. Here C i is the unit power consumption of access point when transmitting data with client node i, where
A A is the additional energy consumption for bid inviting of the access point. M A is the static power consumption of the access point's own system. We consider the energy is finite with the maximum capacity B max A . For any client node i, we denote the harvested energy is E k i , and system consumption is M i . The energy of client node i at the beginning of time slot k as
where k = 1, 2, . . . and B max i is the maximum capacity of i's battery, and C i is the unit power consumption when i transmits data with the access point. A i is the additional energy consumption for sending bid and participating in the auction of client node i. Note that if client node i loses his bid, p k−1 i and C i are both zeroes. Table 1 lists important notations introduced in this section. Now we will firstly introduce the combinatorial auction and afterwards, use this model to capture the interactions between the access point and client network.
Definition 1 (Combinatorial Auction):
In a combinatorial auction model of energy harvesting network, each client node submits one bid to the access point, and this bid consists of a bundle of spectrum opportunities he wants to access as well as his nominal energy payment of that. Based on this model, the final spectrum allocation strategy must satisfy the following two constraints:
• No spectrum opportunity can be allocated to more than one client node;
• No client node can access more than one bundle of spectrum opportunities. Remark 1: Note that in the strict combinatorial auction model, each client node can submit multiple bids to the access point. Different from the strict case, we make a reasonable assumption for explicit analysis of the problem.
We need to consider two relevant parts (i.e., winner determination and payment strategy) to guarantee the maximization of social welfare. The first part is to select the winners to maximize the sum of declared energy valuation. 1 The second part is to charge the winners to submit the truthful energy valuation.
Definition 2 (Winner Determination): For every subset S ⊆ S, we define a function ρ k i (S) to represent the nominal energy payment of client node i forS at time slot k. We use a binary variable ψ k i (S) to denote whether client node i can win the spectrum bundleS at time slot k, i.e., ψ k i (S) = 1 is yes or 0 otherwise. In general, the winner determination aims at solving the following optimization problem, denoted by OPT:
Remark 2: The definition of winner determination shows that our goal is to maximize the social welfare, which is equivalent to the energy compensation of access point. The first constraint implies that one spectrum opportunity is allocated to at most one client node. The second constraint means that one client node can only receive one bundle of spectrum opportunities. The third constraint indicates that each client node can only submit one bid. The following two constraints are the battery restrictions for access point/client nodes while the last one is the binary constraint.
Definition 3 (Truthful Payment): The client nodes in the auction may behave selfishly, so they can manipulate their bids and beat others with untruthful auction. Such malicious behavior not only damages the other client nodes' fairness, but also makes it hard to guarantee the energy supply. We denote the bid b * i = S * i , e * i as the truthful bid of client node i, and b i = {S i , e i } as his declared bid. Since client node i wants his requirement to be satisfied, we can assume S * i ⊆ S i . A truthful payment is to make a payment strategy to resist bid cheating, i.e., no client node can improve his utility (please see (1)) by offering untruthful bid, that is
where u i (b * i ) is the utility in truthful case and u i (b i ) is the declared one.
Summary: Up till now, we have proposed an integrated auction model and guidelines for the network components. The energy harvesting network operates in the following time-slot fashion: 1) 1) the access point harvests energy E k A and each client node i harvests energy E k i ;; 2) considering his own energy, each node i submits his bid b i = {S i , e i } to the access point; 3) the access point collects all bids and makes spectrum allocation based on his own energy and proposed auction model; 4) the access point leases Information Flow to winners of client nodes and receives Energy Flow in return.
IV. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR TRUTHFUL AUCTION MODEL IN ENERGY HARVESTING NETWORK
In this section, we first prove the winner determination problem is NP-hard, and show the upper bound of approximation ratio for polynomial time algorithms. Afterwards, we propose an approximation algorithm to reach this bound efficiently. Finally, we present the payment strategy and prove its economical robustness.
A. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Because of the unstability of energy harvesting network and the unpredictability of harvested energy, the access point cannot guarantee to serve all winners at each time slot. When collecting all bids from the client network, in general, the access point will take different processing behaviors according to the energy storage situation:
• Rational Case: The access point is able to serve all winners in client network since he obtains a sufficient energy in last time slot.
• Extreme Case: The access point cannot serve all winners in client network since he fails to obtain enough energy in last time slot. Since the Extreme Case can be considered as a derivate of the Rational Case, in what follows, we will focus on the analysis of the Rational Case.
Theorem 1: The Winner Determination is NP-hard in the Rational Case.
Proof: We prove the NP-hardness by proposing a reduction from the Maximum Independent Set Problem (MISP) [28] . Given an undirected graph G = (V , E), where V is the vertex set and E is the edge set. We map the set of client nodes as V and the set of spectrum opportunities as E, respectively. For each vertex (i.e., the client node) i, we assume its edges are the corresponding spectrum requirements.
For any two winners w p , w q ∈ W, whose allocated spectrum bundles are S w p and S w q respectively, we can always find S w p S w q = ∅, which indicates W is an independent set of graph G. Given energy valuation e i = 1, the social welfare equals the size of set W.
We know that the above reduction process requires polynomial time. Therefore, the Winner Determination problem is NP-hard.
We now show OPT's upper bound of approximation ratio when applying a polynomial time algorithm, as described in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: For any polynomial time algorithm, the OPT's upper bound of approximation ratio in Rational Case is √ m, where m is the number of spectrum opportunity.
Proof: Recall that OPT can be reduced to MISP (see Theorem 1). Therefore, the approximation ratio of OPT for any polynomial time algorithm should not exceed that of MISP. According to [29] , the upper bound of MISP is n 1− . Using an appropriate division manner of spectrum opportunity, we can achieve the implicated assumption m n 2 in the problem reduction. As a result, we can find the OPT's upper bound of approximation ration in Rational Case is √ m.
B. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM TO SOLVE OPT
In previous part, Theorem 1 shows that it is NP-hard when solving OPT to get an optimal solution to Winner Determination. However, in the actual network scenario, the access point is required to allocate spectrum opportunities accurately and efficiently. Now we will propose an approximation algorithm to solve OPT with good accuracy and high efficiency, and meanwhile, proposed algorithm can achieve the upper bound in Theorem 2.
We design the following APProximation algorithm (APP) depicted in Algorithm 1. Let B k A , {C i } and b i be the input, and W be the output of this algorithm, respectively. Proposed algorithm consists of three steps: 3) Sorting bids to List L as follows:
Client node i's bid is denied 10)
End If 11) End For
•
Step 1: Initialization. In this step, all client nodes submit their bids to the access point, and we give initial values to the winner set W and battery limitation B temp .
• Step 2: Sorting Procedure. We sort the bids in a sequence such that The ordering principle of bids should have following characteristics: 1) the bids with higher energy valuation should be ordered first; 2) the bids with fewer spectrum requirement should be ordered first. In other words, the bids with greater valuation-to-requirement ratio have a high priority and thus, we choose the principle with the form of Proof: Let the number of client network's bids be n, the same as the number of client nodes. In Step 2, the computational complexity of sorting process is O (n log n). And in Step 3, we only need to traverse n bids in List L to select winners, where the computational complexity is O (n). Concluding above, we can find the time complexity of Algorithm APP is polynomial.
Theorem 4: Algorithm APP can approximate the optimal solution to OPT with factor √ m. In order to show our intuitions directly, we simply omit the proof to Theorem 4 here. Interested readers may refer to Appendix A for more derivation details.
Therefore, the proposed algorithm can reach the approximation ratio for OPT and it is a polynomial algorithm, which means the proposed algorithm is accurate and efficient. We believe that the time to run the auction process can be neglected, especially compared with the allocation period in Fig. 2 . We should note that the approximation ratio is computed in worst case (i.e., the Rational Case), and we will show the performance of proposed algorithm is much better than that ratio in simulation part.
C. PAYMENT STRATEGY
Recall that in previous part, we have obtained efficient social welfare of OPT based on declared energy valuations of client network. However, client nodes are usually with egoism and they may manipulate bids and beat others by untruthful auction. It means that client nodes may promise to offer a high energy-compensation to the access point in order to win the spectrum auction, while break their promises to improve their own utilities in payment. This behavior leads the network to be chaos and especially, the access point cannot maintain a stable energy supply. That is to say, we need a payment strategy to defend market manipulating.
We now design a payment strategy which can guarantee truthfulness described in Section III-C, and show its economical robustness next.
Definition 4 (Payment Strategy):
For each client node i ∈ L in Algorithm 1, we use a function next(i) to denote the first follower in List L which loses the auction but can win if i is absent. We now have following payment strategy for i:
• Client node i will pay nothing if he loses or next(i) does not exist;
• If i wins and next(i) exists, i will pay
where γ = next(i) for simplification of the subscript.
D. ECONOMICAL ROBUSTNESS
We first give a lemma to show the sufficient conditions for a truthful auction. Based on this lemma, we further prove that the proposal is a truthful algorithm. Lemma 1: The combinatorial auction model for energy harvesting network is truthful, if and only if the following three conditions hold:
• Ex-post budget balance. All client nodes are rational and they will never pay more than their nominal energy payment of spectrum opportunity.
• Monotonicity. In conclusion, proposed combinatorial auction model is truthful.
V. A PRACTICAL MODIFICATION OF PROPOSED MODEL
As illustrated in previous section, the proposed model (we name it as the original model hereafter) cannot be solved optimally in polynomial time. Thus, we propose an approximation algorithm to reach its approximation ratio. In this section, we modify original model to a practical and also truthful one, which can be addressed optimally.
A. PRACTICAL VIEW OF PREVIOUS AUCTION MODEL
Prior to definition of modified auction model, we shall describe why and how to change original model. We first summarize the differences between original model and modified model, mainly in three aspects:
• Flexibility. First of all, each client node only requires full-time usage or nothing in time dimension. That is to say, each winner will take use of corresponding frequency resource in every auction period. This difference is a necessary tradeoff to obtain the optimal solution.
• Requirement. Moreover, each client node only use consecutive frequencies, but not the discrete cases. This difference is based on the reality in IoT scenario.
• Energy level. Finally, to simplify the analysis and maintain the optimality, we assume that energy is sufficient in each allocation period. This difference is also a necessary tradeoff to obtain the optimal solution. We now formally define the modified auction. The resource center divides the spectrum opportunity to S = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m }, where f j is the gap point of frequency and f min = f 1 f 2 . . . f m = f max (shown as Fig. 6 ). In client network, the client node i submits his bid as b i = {S i , e i } to the access point, where 
where these constraints follow that in OPT. Definition 6 (Payment Strategy of Modified Model): As will be proved in Theorem 6, the modified auction can achieve optimal solution to OPT-M. This stimulates us to use Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [30] , [31] to design a truthful payment strategy.
For each client node i, we denote SW −i as the social welfare which is obtained when i is absent. Since in the modified model, i can only receive S i or nothing. We use the notation p i to describe the posterior energy valuation of i, that is to say, VOLUME 6, 2018 p i = e i if he wins or p i = 0 otherwise. We finally have the payment strategy as:
Note that SW −i is a constant in the view of client node i.
B. OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO MODIFIED MODEL
Different with previous OPT (please see Section III-C), OPT-M can be optimally solved in polynomial time. In this part, we will propose a dynamic programing algorithm. Based on this algorithm, we compute the computational complexity and prove its optimality.
We again define a function who(f a , f b ) to find which client node submits the maximal energy valuation (F max (f a , f b ) ) on frequency interval [f a , f b ]. And we use the array R to contain allocated spectrum intervals. We now show the following Dynamic Programming Algorithm (DPA) as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to Solve
Theorem 6: Computational complexity of Algorithm DPA is O(n 2 ) and it can achieve optimal solution to OPT-M in Rational Case.
Proof: Obviously, the computational complexity of Algorithm DPA is O(n 2 ) due to the computational complexity of nest-loop. Then we will use mathematical induction to prove that R[m] is the optimal solution to OPT-M.
• When n = 1, it is obvious that R[n] = [f 1 , f 1 ] is the optimal solution.
• Suppose that when n = g m − 1, the array R[n] is the optimal solution to OPT-M of g individual spectrum intervals. Now let us turn to the case n = g + 1.
Considering the consecutive requirement of modified model, if the (g + 1)th frequency interval is included in DPA, it must have the form of [h+1, g+1], where h g and R [h] are the optimal solution of h spectrum intervals. According to Algorithm 2, we have
. By traversing h, Algorithm 2 finds the optimal allocation for g + 1 individual spectrum intervals. Combining above, we can find that DPA can achieve optimal solution to OPT-M.
C. ECONOMICAL ROBUSTNESS
In this part, we will show that the modified auction model is truthful with Theorem 7.
Theorem 7: Modified auction model is truthful. Proof: Theorem 5 shows that the modified auction model can be optimally solved in polynomial time. According to [32] , VCG mechanism can guarantee that the payment strategy is truthful in the optimal solution context. We only give a brief proof here and interested readers can refer to [32] for more details.
For client node i, we suppose that other nodes are fixed. The utility of i when he bids truthfully can be derived as
where the notation p j |e i means the posterior energy valuation of j when i declares e i . However, when i lies, his utility turns to be u i = e i − SW −i + j =i p j |e i . Recall that when i submits e i , the social welfare can be maximized, that is to say, we have
Combining (8) and (9) and considering SW −i is a constant, we have
which means that the modified auction model is truthful. Therefore, Theorem 7 holds.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the system-level-performance of our design. We use the social welfare and ratio of spectrum utilization as the performance metrics in our evaluation. We first show the performance of the proposed algorithm APP for the original model under different environment conditions, and then compare the performance under modified model to show DPA's optimality.
Note that since the unit energy consumption varies in different physical systems, in this section, we simply normalize the parameters and variables to verify proposed scheme directly and clearly.
A. PERFORMANCE OF ORIGINAL MODEL
We assume each allocation period lasts 1 minute and the resource center divides the allocation period into 20 individual segments (i.e., the time unit is 3 seconds). Additionally, the wireless channel is divided into 20 frequency intervals and therefore, the number of spectrum opportunities for client nodes to choose is m = 400. We run the simulation for 15 allocation periods to obtain a complete knowledge of proposed model. Considering the time-frequency flexibility of client nodes, we assume that the spectrum requirement of each client node is uniform in [1, m] in each time slot k, and the maximal requirement for any client node is 10 spectrum opportunities.
For the access point, we assume that the system consumption is M A = 2, and unit transmission consumption is C i = 1. We compare our design with different type of access points. The types we consider are:
• APProximation type (APP): the access point applies our approach (algorithm APP).
• Energy-First Type (EFT): the access point first serves the requirement with greater energy valuation.
• Best-Effort Type (BET): the access point first serves the requirement with greater size.
• AVeraGe type (AVG): the access point serves the bids with non-increasing order of average energy valuation per spectrum opportunity.
• RanDom Type (RDT): the access point randomly serves the client nodes' requests. Fig. 7 shows the social welfares in different schemes, and the accumulative results are described in Fig. 8 . From these two figures, we can find that proposed APP is superior to all other schemes. Meanwhile, the social welfare can obtain a steady growth in the time domain.
Because of the NP-hardness of OPT, we cannot give a numerical comparison between the optimal solution and the solution to APP. However, the number of entire spectrum opportunities is m = 400 and maximal energy valuation for any bid is B max i = 10. Therefore, the social welfare of optimal solution is no larger than 400 × 10 = 4000. As illustrated in Theorem 2, the approximation ratio in Rational Case is 1 √ 400
× 4000 = 200. Hence, we can conclude that 2 We believe there indeed exists a better choice for client nodes to submit their energy valuations, and we only concentrate on the performance under a simple valuation mechanism here. proposed APP performs much better than the approximation ratio (please see Fig. 7 ). We can obtain that AVG maintains the best utilization ratio and APP is the second best but also acceptable. Concluding above, we can see proposed APP compromises the utilization ratio to achieve a better social welfare performance.
B. PERFORMANCE ROBUSTNESS UNDER ORIGINAL MODEL
In last part, we assume that the energy supplement is stable and continuous, which indicates that the surrounding environment is cosy and comfortable. In order to show our scheme's robustness, we divide the environment level according to the severity of the surrounding environment: VOLUME 6, 2018 • Level 0: the surrounding environment is cosy and comfortable, and the results are shown in previous part (Fig. 7 to Fig. 10 ).
• Level 1: a bad environment where the access point cannot harvest energy in time interval [a, b] . Lots of reasons can lead to Level 1, for example, the damage of access point's harvesting device or the environmental factors.
• Level 2: a terrible case where all network devices (i.e., the access point and client nodes) cannot harvest energy in time interval [a, b] . We run all previous schemes under Level 1 and Level 2, and the results are shown in Fig. 11 to Fig. 14 . In particular, we name the time slots when harvesting devices in their mutations as sudden death (k = 7) or recovery (k = 11), respectively. Note that it refers to the Rational Case when the network condition is stable, and the Extreme Case between sudden death and recovery. Fig. 12 . In this network condition, the client nodes can normally harvest energy while the access point can only receive energy support from the client network in [7, 11] . Comparing with the performance in Level 0 (i.e., Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 ), we can draw following points: 1) APP, AVG and EFT have the almost equal social welfare in Level 1 and Level 0 even when k ∈ [7, 11] , respectively. This is because the access point can obtain enough energy compensation from the client nodes although he cannot harvest energy himself; 2) the social welfare of BET/RDT decreases (especially in [7, 11] ), and the reason is that the access point cannot obtain enough energy support; 3) the proposed APP outperforms others in Level 1. In Fig. 13 and Fig. 14, we show the social welfare performance in Level 2. In this network condition, neither the access point nor client nodes can harvest energy in [7, 11] . Based on results of Level 0 and Level 1, we can conclude the following points: 1) since APP, AVG and EFT can store a higher energy level before k = 7, they can maintain the network service to some extent comparing with others; 2) the energy scarcity influence all previous schemes, however, proposed APP outperforms others in most time slots; 3) proposed APP outperforms others in Level 2.
Up till now, we have compared social welfare in different levels and we can find APP has a better performance even when the access point cannot harvest energy or worst of all, the whole network fails to harvest energy.
C. PERFORMANCE OF MODIFIED MODEL
In this section, we turn to the modified auction model in Section V. To show the optimality of algorithm DPA, we only focus on the performance in the stable environment with different network topology. We assume that the surrounding environment is cosy and comfortable and vary the number of client nodes n from 100 to 1000, and the access point holds m = 400 spectrum opportunities. The maximum requirement for any client node is 10 spectrum opportunities, and the energy valuation is normalized to uniformly distributed in [0, 1] .
We compare the algorithm DPA with previous schemes, i.e., the APP, EFT, BET, AVG and RDT. Although APP is designed for OPT, we can implement it in OPT-M since that OPT-M is namely a special case of OPT. Therefore, we can check above algorithms to obtain the performance of social welfare and ratio of spectrum utilization. We can see that the social welfares of all schemes increase with the number of client nodes n. Meanwhile, DPA, APP and AVG can outperform others significantly. And DPA performs closely with APP and AVG when the number of client nodes is between 100 and 500. However, the gap between DPA and APP/AVG becomes wide when n 500. We should note that the approximation ratio here is 1 √ 400
× 400 × 1 = 20. Previous APP preforms much better than this particular ratio (especially, when n is large). In Fig. 16 , we show the utilization ratio of different schemes under the modified model. We can find that the ratios of all schemes increase with the number of client nodes n.
Note that neither DPA nor APP processes the highest ratio, which can be explained as a necessary tradeoff to achieve high social welfare. In other words, DPA and APP achieve high social welfare with the cost of the ratio of spectrum utilization.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have put forward a central energy harvesting network to meet the heterogeneous requirements from time-frequency aspect in harsh environments. Particularly, a combinatorial auction model has been built for interactions capturing between access points and client nodes. Besides, we have provided the NP-hardness proof in resource allocations with energy constraints as well as an optimality approaching approximation algorithm. Moreover, we have proved the truthfulness of our auction model and given out a practical modified model. Extensive simulations have exhibited the efficiency and robustness of our scheme, which is useful to design practical energy harvesting networks.
Current work is merely an initial work on this topic, which aims at providing guidelines to design practical energy harvesting networks. Future work will focus on modifying the model by considering the dynamic characteristics of energy harvesting. (11) Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain the social welfare of OPT as
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 4 IN SECTION III-B
here the expression j∈W OPT S j is the total amount of spectrum opportunity allocated by the access point and thus, it is bounded 3 by m. We proceed to show
In order to improve this proof's readability, we now formally define three sets as follows.
• Set : = W OPT W APP , which means the common bids of W OPT and W APP .
• Set : = W OPT − , which represents the bids that appeared in W OPT but not in W APP .
• Set : = W APP − , which shows the bids that can win in APP but lose in OPT. For each j ∈ W OPT , 4 there always exists an i ∈ W APP that r j = r i since j and i are actually the same bid of client network. Therefore, we have the following inequality: 
where the inequality that S * i 1 always holds. For each j ∈ , since the bid j is absent in W APP (or exactly, the set ), we can conclude that there exists a spectrum opportunity s g ∈ S j (in W OPT ) has been allocated previously to, let's say, the bid i (in W APP ). In other words, we have the following condition: ∀j ∈ , ∃s g ∈ S j , i ∈ , s.t. s g ∈ S i , r i r j . (15) On the other hand, for each bid i ∈ W APP (or exactly, the set ), there can be plenty of bids in W OPT that fits above condition. We then use the set W i OPT to denote the bids in W OPT associating i ∈ W APP . Note that the maximal size of W i OPT is |S i | since any two bids in W OPT has no common interested spectrum opportunity. Therefore, we have 
where i ∈ W APP . We then proceed to obtain:
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